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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5608
This paper studies the causes of the low development 
of the insurance sector in the Middle East and North 
African (MENA) region, particularly for long term 
insurance. The paper shows that life and non-life 
premiums, as well as assets, are very low relative to 
expected levels given per capita income and demographic 
characteristics, and examines the causes of such poor 
performance. There is a wide range of factors constraining 
the development of the industry, including the absence 
of mandatory insurance in key areas, the predominant 
presence of the state in some countries, gaps in regulation 
and supervision, unsupportive tax regimes, fragmented 
market structures, a chronic lack of suitably skilled 
people, as well as the absence of products that conform 
with cultural/religious preferences, especially in the case 
of life insurance.
This paper is a product of the Financial and Private Sector Development Unit, Middle East and North Africa Region. It 
is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development 
policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.
org. The author may be contacted at rlester@worldbank.org.
The lack of development of the insurance sector is a 
matter of concern, as research shows that the sector can 
contribute to both financial and economic development. 
Key recommendations to accelerate the development 
of the sector include wider introduction of mandatory 
insurance lines that have clear positive externalities, 
continuing the privatization process for government 
owned insurers, employing non capital techniques 
to force rationalization of insurance sectors with too 
many small and inefficient players, removing tax 
distortions, taking steps to stabilize motor third party 
liability markets (typically the largest line of business), 
strengthening reporting and disclosure, regulating banc-
assurance, improving consumer protection, further 
developing Takaful long term insurance (‘Family 
Insurance’), and establishing regional centers of excellence 












                                                           
* This paper draws on reports from AXCO, Swiss Re Sigma, the Middle East Insurance Review, discussions with 
national  insurance  supervisors,  and  World  Bank  and  IMF  assessments  and  economic  databases.  The  author 
benefitted from onsite visits to most of the countries referenced and discussions with Willis (Reinsurance brokers) 
and Moodys in London. The author is also grateful to Roberto Rocha for extensive comments and contributions to 
the  text,  to  Dimitri  Vittas,  Serap  Gonulal  and  Martin  Buehler  for  comments  and  suggestions,  and  to  Diego 
Sourrouille for competent research assistance.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
The insurance sector can play a critical role in financial and economic development.  By 
introducing risk pooling and reducing the impact of large losses, the sector reduces the amount of 
capital that would be needed to cover these losses, encouraging additional investment, output, 
innovation, and competition.  By introducing risk-based pricing for insurance protection, the 
sector can change the behavior of economic agents, contributing to the prevention of accidents, 
improved health outcomes, and higher efficiency gains. As financial intermediaries with long 
investment horizons, insurance companies can contribute to the provision of long-term finance 
and effective risk management.  Finally, the sector can also improve the efficiency of other 
segments of the financial system, such as banking and bond markets, by enhancing the value of 
collateral through property insurance and reducing losses at default through credit guarantees.  
Research shows that the insurance sector contributes to long-run growth (Arena (2008)). 
 
The insurance sector remains undeveloped in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region, even after controlling for income levels and demographic characteristics. This is a 
matter of concern, as the sector could make an important contribution to financial and economic 
development.  The paper shows that the slow pace of development of the sector is due to a 
number of factors, including the lack of compulsory insurance in key areas, the predominance of 
state  companies  in  some  countries,  weaknesses  in  the  regulatory  and  supervisory  regime, 
inadequate tax rules, lack of professional skills, and cultural factors.  Policy reforms and product 
innovation could go a long way in fostering the development of this important sector in the 
current decade and beyond.  
 
This paper reviews the status of the insurance sector in the MENA region, identifies the 
main factors that have hindered the sector’s growth, and proposes an agenda for faster 
development.  The paper is structured as follows.  The second section provides an overview of 
the size of the sector by comparison with other countries.  The third section examines the main 
business lines. The fourth section examines the structure of the insurance industry.  The fifth 
section examines the main regulatory and supervisory issues.  The sixth section identifies the 
stages of development by main country groups.  The seventh section examines the particular case 
of Morocco, the MENA country that has made most progress in developing the sector relative to 
potential.  Finally the eighth section provides a roadmap for the sector‟s development in MENA.     
 
2.  The Insurance Sector in MENA: An Overview of Development Patterns 
2.1. The Small Size of the Insurance Sector: Basic International Comparisons   
 
The insurance sector in MENA, and especially the life sector, remains undeveloped.  As 
shown in Tables 1 and 2, most MENA countries have low penetration levels (measured by the 
ratio of gross premiums to GDP) compared to international benchmarks. The non-life sector 
(average premium of 0.9% of GDP) is roughly comparable to those in East Asia and Eastern 
Europe,  but  smaller  than  those  in  the  new  EU  accession  countries  and  Latin  America,  and 
substantially  smaller  than  the  non-life  sectors  of  OECD  countries.    There  are  significant 
differences across MENA countries, with some countries displaying very low penetration ratios 
(Algeria, Egypt, Yemen, and several GCC countries), and only three countries showing ratios 5 
 
above 1.5% of GDP (Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco).  MENA‟s life insurance sector is even 
smaller, with an average penetration ratio of only 0.3% of GDP and is an outlier by comparison 
with other regions. Only three countries (Lebanon, Bahrain and Morocco) display penetration 
ratios comparable to those in other emerging markets. Bahrain‟s penetration level reflects its 
historical regional role and significant health insurance portfolios.  
 
Table 1: Insurance Premiums and Assets (% of GDP) 2009
1 
Country
2  Non-Life Premium 
(% of GDP) 
Life Premium 
(% of GDP) 
Assets 
(% of GDP) 
Algeria  0.60  0.05  0.8 
Bahrain  1.43  0.70  12.1 
Egypt  0.42  0.37  3.9 
Jordan  1.53  0.21  4.8 
KSA  0.46  0.07  - 
Kuwait  0.34  0.09  1.8 
Lebanon  2.18  0.98  7.2 
Libya  0.48  0.01  - 
Morocco  1.54  0.89  19.0 
Oman  0.97  0.20  2.4 
Qatar  0.67  0.01  2.7 
Syria  0.92  0.01  0.0 
Tunisia  1.38  0.25  0.6 
UAE  1.34  0.28  3.1 
Yemen  0.24  0.02  - 
MENA   0.97  0.28  5.3 
GCC .  0.87  0.23  4.4 
Non-GCC   1.03  0.31  6.1 
Oil   0.80  0.16  3.8 
Non-Oil   1.22  0.45  7.1 
Sources: AXCO Reports, Swiss Re. Sigma, IMF/WB databases, national sources 
 
Table 2: Average penetration rates and assets (% of GDP), MENA and other regions 
 
















Average non life premium  0.97  0.8  1.7  0.9  2.3  1.3  0.5 
Average life premium  0.28  1.6  1.1  0.1  4.0  0.7  1.2 
Average Assets  4.9  14.8  5.2  2.7  45.0  4.9  6.4 
Source: Swiss Re. Sigma, AXCO Reports, WB calculations 
 
In terms of the ratio of insurance assets to GDP, the region would seem to compare better, 
but this result is due to very few countries.  Excluding only one country (Morocco) the MENA 
average would drop to 3.5% of GDP, below the average of other emerging regions. Excluding 
Bahrain the average would drop further to 2.7% of GDP.
3 
                                                           
1 Separately identified health insurance is not included in the following econometric analysis – see Box 1. 
2 Iraq has not been included because results are affected by conflict.  Djibouti has not been included because of lack 
of data. 
3 Bahrain‟s assets reflect its expatriate population.   6 
 
2.2. The Small Size of the Insurance Sector: Controlling for Income Levels and Demographics
4   
 
MENA’s relative position does not change significantly controlling for income levels.  As 
shown in Figure 1, only Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia have larger non-life premiums than those 
predicted by their levels of per capita income.  Lebanon and Syria‟s non-life sectors are close to 
their predicted levels, but most other MENA countries have much smaller non-life sectors than 
predicted  by  their  income  levels.    Regarding  the  life  sector  (Figure  2),  only  Morocco‟s 
penetration ratio is above the predicted level, albeit by a small margin.  Lebanon‟s life sector is 
only slightly below the predicted level, but most other MENA countries have life sectors which 
are much smaller than those predicted by their levels of development.  The same general pattern 
holds for the ratio of assets to GDP (Figure 3).  Morocco is again the only exception, reflecting 
in part the greater role of employer provided benefits including group life and pensions. Pensions 
are tax effective for employers in Morocco and together with personal savings products (largely 
sold through bancassurance channels) account for nearly 60% of life premiums. Egypt, Jordan 
and Lebanon are close to the predicted levels, but the insurance assets of most other MENA 
countries are much smaller than predicted by their income levels.    
 
The relative position of MENA countries remains essentially the same after also controlling 
for basic demographic factors and inflation (Figures 4, 5 and 6).   Besides income, basic 
demographic  factors  such  as  the  size  of  the  population,  population  density,  and  the  age 
dependency ratio may also affect significantly the demand for insurance products.  Likewise, 
inflation may have an impact on the demand for insurance products, especially life products.
5  
However, the relative position of MENA countries does not change significantly after controlling 
for all these factors.  As shown in Figure 4, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia are the only countries 
that have non-life sectors above their predicted levels, Lebanon, Syria and Iran are close to their 
predicted levels, while most other MENA countries are below their predicted levels.    
 
In the case of life insurance, the differences between actual and predicted values declines 
somewhat when accounting for demographic factors, but Morocco remain the only positive 
outlier in the region.  The somewhat better fit in life insurance reflects the small populations 
and low population densities of several MENA countries, as well as their relative youth. Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia are closer to their predicted values, but only Morocco remains 
significantly above.  The same pattern holds for assets under management.  The countries that 
have larger life sectors tend to have larger assets, reflecting the larger technical provisions and 
reserves required for longer terms contracts written in this subsector.  Again, Morocco remains 





   
                                                           
4 This section draws on the panel regression models developed in Feyen, Lester, and Rocha (2010). 
5 Population captures the potential for economies of scale and population density captures the scope for distribution 
efficiencies. Age dependency is relevant for life insurance and captures the demand for life cycle financial products 
(e.g. education and retirement).  See Feyen, Lester, and Rocha (2010). 
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Figure 1: Non-Life Penetration (% of GDP) and GDP Per Capita 
 
Figure 2: Life Penetration (% of GDP) and GDP Per Capita 
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Figure 4: Non-Life Penetration Ratio (% of GDP): Actual and Predicted Levels 
 
Figure 5: Life Penetration Ratios (% of GDP): Actual and Predicted Levels 
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2.3 The Small Size of the Insurance Sector: Identifying the Constraining Factors  
The slow development of the insurance sector in MENA is due to a wide variety of factors, 
including regulatory factors, market structure, lack of development of other segments of 
the financial sector, social/human development factors, and culture/religious factors.  Some 
of these factors have been identified and tested in recent empirical research.  Other constraining 
factors are less amenable to measurement and empirical testing, but will also be discussed in the 
sections below.  Most importantly, some of the constraining factors are out of reach of policy 
makers or can only be changed very gradually, while other factors can be addressed over shorter 
period of time.  The sections below make an effort to examine all the potential constraining 
factors, in order to identify a roadmap for the development of the insurance industry.  
   
Recent  empirical  research  (Feyen,  Lester,  and  Rocha  (2010))  shows  that  the  insurance 
sector is driven by a broad range of factors and explains in part why MENA insurance 
sectors remain undeveloped.  For example, this research shows that insurance sectors are less 
developed in countries with Muslim majorities, due to the lack of compliance of conventional 
insurance  products  with  Shariah  rules.  This  result  is  relevant  for  most  MENA  countries.  
Research also shows that the demand for insurance is partly driven by the existence of retail 
credit  markets  (mortgage  loans,  personal  loans),  which  are  not  yet  well  developed  in  many 
MENA countries. Also, the dominant presence of state insurers tends to slow down development, 
a  result  which  is  relevant  for  at  least  four  MENA  countries  which  are  transitioning  from  a 
historical legacy of state monopolies (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Syria).
6    
 
There are other factors which are more difficult to measure and test empirically, but that 
have been powerful impediments to the growth of the sector.  For example, several MENA 
countries have been slow to introduce compulsory insurance in key areas such as occupational 
injury  and  health.    Also,  MENA  countries  generate  limited  premium  revenues  from  car 
insurance, despite a large fleet of cars per population.  This is due to several specific problems, 
as shown below. The excessive fragmentation of insurance markets in MENA may also have 
hindered the sector‟s growth – many insurers do not have critical size to build adequate risk 
pools, underwrite contracts and innovate.  The lack of professional skills in the industry has been 
another major deterrent.  Finally, weaknesses in regulation and consumer protection (resulting 
inter alia in lack of transparency and lack of trust) have also hindered the development of the 
sector.  These issues are examined in the following sections.         
 
3.  Main Business Lines 
 
The analysis of the main business lines sheds further insights on the slow pace of insurance 
development in the MENA region. This is because the development of the insurance sector 
generally follows some well defined patterns.  The non-life sector is more important in the early 
stages  of  development.    In  the  very  initial  stages,  development  is  driven  by  coverage  of 
transportation  and  trade  risks.    In  the  next  stage,  households  acquire  motor  vehicles  and 
governments  make  motor  third  party  liability  insurance  compulsory.  Thereafter,  mortgage 
markets develop and household insurance becomes more common. Eventually, a middle class 
                                                           
6 Annex Table 5 provides an illustration of research on the drivers of the insurance sector, with the share of 
insurance assets to GDP as the dependent variable (see Feyen, Lester and Rocha 2010). 10 
 
develops and life insurance becomes attractive for life cycle planning, including pension-like 
products.  In many developed countries, the life sector plays a critical role in social protection, as 
public  schemes  mature  and  fiscal  pressures  mount.  (Annex  Table  3  provides  a  stylized 
description of the stages of development). 
 
The breakdown of insurance premiums in MENA by business lines only partly conforms to 
the typical pattern of development.   Table 3 provides a breakdown of non-life premiums, 
showing that transportation related insurance (Marine, Aviation and Transit or MAT) accounts 
on average for a small share of the totalnon-life premium and is broadly unrelated to income 
levels.  Motor insurance account for the largest share of the insurance business in most countries 
but also bears little relationship to incomes. Construction related insurance tends to be higher in 
the oil and gas rich countries, but there is no consistent pattern.  Life insurance (not shown in 
Table 3) is undeveloped, especially in the higher income countries, also implying a deviation 
from usual patterns. 
 
Table 3: Breakdown of Non-Life Premiums by Major Line of Business, 2008 
Source: AXCO Reports 
 
Motor  insurance  accounts  for  the  largest  share  of  the  non-life  premium,  but  MENA 
countries still collect small aggregate motor vehicle premiums considering the size of their 
car fleets.   As shown in Figure 7, motor premiums are well below the levels that would be 
predicted  by  the  number  of  cars  (scaled  by  the  population),  with  the  exception  of  Jordan, 
Morocco, and Tunisia.  All but the least developed MENA countries have introduced mandatory 
Motor Third Party Liability Insurance – MTPL (Annex Table 3).   
  Breakdown of Non-Life Premium (% of total) 






Algeria  47  42  9  1 
Bahrain  48  39  7  7 
Egypt  33  25  32  10 
Jordan  60  20  10  10 
KSA  46  26  18  10 
Kuwait  40  15  16  29 
Lebanon  51  19  9  21 
Libya  31  41  21  6 
Morocco  56  12  7  25 
Oman  54  19  9  18 
Qatar  21  31  14  34 
Syria  65  19  12  6 
Tunisia  59  9  10  22 
UAE  35  13  15  37 
Yemen  33  20  22  25 
MENA   45  23  14  17 
GCC  41  24  13  23 
Non-GCC  48  23  15  14 
Oil  43  27  13  16 
Non-Oil  49  18  15  19 11 
 
Figure 7: Motor vehicle premiums versus ratio of cars per 1000 persons 
 
Source: Axco, WDI 
There  are  four  main  factors  limiting  motor  premium  revenues  in  MENA:  lack  of 
compliance, understatement of provision for outstanding claims, price controls in some 
jurisdictions,  and  predatory  price  competition.  The  level  of  compliance  with  compulsory 
motor insurance seems low.  Large segments of the population do not seem to understand the 
importance of this insurance and regard it as a tax
 7.  While most countries require evidence of 
insurance before registering motor vehicles, this has not been a successful mechanism for raising 
compliance levels in MENA.  False policy documents not issued by insurers, poor validation 
procedures, and misclassification of vehicles all contribute to avoidance strategies by drivers, 
who prefer to “settle in the street”, no matter how expensive relative to the formal insurance 
process. 
 
A second reason for inadequate motor premium income is the chronic understatement of 
motor  third  party  claim  provisions  by  insurers  combined  with  price  controls.  Claims 
provisions feed directly into the calculation of premium levels and if understated will result in 
inadequate pricing.  This is particularly evident in the countries where the legal profession plays 
a significant role in the claims negotiation process and claims can take many years to settle.   
 
This  understatement  of  claims  costs  (and  hence  technical  premiums)  is  an  even  more 
serious issue where MTPL rates are approved by the government (often the Ministry of the 
Interior) and have a political aspect.  Examples of rates not being adjusted for many years can 
be found in numerous countries, including Kuwait and, until recently, Egypt. 
 
The fourth major cause of inadequate motor third party premiums in several countries is 
predatory  price  competition  sometimes  in  the  belief  that  investment  returns  will  cover 
underwriting losses.  Motor third party insurance is cash rich and funds can be invested quickly. 
This  attracts  entrepreneurs  who  understate  claims  provisions  and  often  adopt  poor  claims 
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handling practices. Under-pricing by small companies is often combined with under-reserving, 
leading to prolonged disputes and settlement delays. This affects the reputation of insurers and 
contributes to pervasive public mistrust. Competition for market shares in a small market can 
ultimately result in pyramidal structures, leading to larger losses and even insolvency.  Table 4 
shows MTPL loss ratios in countries for which the data is available on a net incurred basis. 
 
Table 4: MTPL Loss Ratios (%) in Selected Countries
8 
Country  2004  2008 
Egypt  292  316 
Jordan  87  101 
UAE  76  89 
Tunisia                    114  87 
Morocco  84  75 
Sources:  AXCO, Supervisors Reports 
 
Property and construction is the second most important line of business, is clearly larger in 
oil  producing  countries  and  clearly  associated  with  coverage  of  risks  in  oil  and  gas 
extractive industries.  Interestingly, revenues are larger in the oil producing countries outside 
the GCC.  It is also noticeable that agriculture does not yet generate a substantial income stream 
in the relevant countries (Egypt, Morocco, Syria).  
 
Transportation  (MAT)  premiums  account  for  a  relatively  low  share  of  the  non-life 
premium in all sub-groups. Not surprisingly, it is larger in the countries that have a major 
international airline, such as Egypt, the KSA and the UAE.  The strategic location of these 
countries between the Western and Eastern hemispheres is being exploited with a number of 
successful  international  airlines  being  established.  The  resulting  hull  and  liability  insurance 
business contributes to premium income, although most of this risk is reinsured internationally. 
 
Seven countries have shares in excess of 10% under the ‘Other’ heading.  In the case of the 
oil and gas producing countries this reflects partly liability and engineering business arising from 
oil and gas extraction and a requirement (particularly in GCC countries) that employers cover for 
occupational injuries. Workman‟s compensation is compulsory for expatriates in some states.  In 
the case of Morocco, compulsory workman‟s compensation is handled through the private sector.   
 
All  in all, the insensitivity of non-life and life premiums  to income levels  suggests that 
insurance penetration in MENA is still primarily driven by large enterprises, compulsory 
insurance,  and  effective  enforcement,  rather  than  voluntary  purchases  by  the  private 
sector. This is true for both the non-life and life sectors.  The countries with partially developed 
life  insurance  sectors  have  historical  European  connections  (Jordan,  Lebanon,  Tunisia  and 
Morocco).  Most of the remainder has virtually non-existent life markets despite, in some cases, 
very high income levels.  
 
Finally,  health  insurance  is  becoming  an  important  line  of  business  in  some  MENA 
countries, although growing from a low base.  Health insurance is becoming a sizable industry 
                                                           
8 The Tunisian ratios reflect an effective reform program while the Egyptian ratios reflect a significant upgrading of 
claims provisions in the state owned insurers. 13 
 
in some countries, and is also growing in MENA, although from a low base.  Because health 
insurance is largely idiosyncratic, it has not been included in the econometric or business line 
analysis (Box 1). 
 
Box 1 - Health Insurance 
 
Health insurance shows little correlation with income levels or structural variables.   As 
shown  in  Figure  8,  health  insurance  appears  to  be  driven  by  idiosyncratic  factors  and  path 
dependencies.   The decisions of the KSA and  Abu Dhabi  to  require expatriates  to  take out 
private health insurance (and the consideration other GCC countries are giving to this) reflects 
the high levels of their expatriate populations and a desire to deal with attendant fiscal pressures.  
The relatively high penetration levels in the Francophone countries and Jordan reflect gaps in the 
social insurance system. 
 
Figure 8:   Health insurance penetration versus income levels 
 
 
Source: AXCO reports and World Bank analysis 
 
 
4.  Industry Structure and Performance 
4.1. Overview of Market Structure 
 
There are on average 25 licensed insurers per country, the bulk of which licensed as non-
life  insurers  or  composites  (Table  5).    The  small  number  of  life  insurers  reflects  the  low 
development of this sector in the region.  Some countries do not license composites any longer 
but the existing composites have been so far grandfathered.   The average market share of the 
three top companies is about 52%, but there are wide variations across countries, and some 
markets seem very concentrated.  State insurers still hold a significant  share of the non-life 
market in 4 countries.  As shown in Figure 8, there is a positive correlation between the share of 
state insurers and the share of the three largest companies.   This is not surprising, reflecting the 
historical legacy of state monopoly in these countries, exercised through large companies. 
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Table 5: Indicators of Industry Structure 
Country  Number of insurers  % of non-life 
market held 
by the top 
three 
insurers 






Total  Non Life  Life  Composite 
Algeria  15  -  1  14  62  72   
Bahrain  36  29  3  4  43  0   
Egypt  28  15  10  3  69  61  Y 
Jordan  28  10  1  17  25  0  Y 
KSA  26  N/A  N/A  N/A  43  22   
Kuwait  29  14  2  13  46  0   
Lebanon  54  18  5  31  31  0  Y 
Libya  9  -  -  9  80  44   
Morocco  18  8  1  9  47  0  Y 
Oman  23  12  2  9  57  0  Y 
Qatar  9  6    3  95  0   
Syria  13  9  9  13  53  47   
Tunisia  17  3  2  12  49  20   
UAE  57  N/A  N/A  N/A  23  0   
Yemen  12  2  -  10  67  14   
MENA Av.  25  11  4  11  52  -  - 
OECD Av.  179  40  106  33  -  -  - 
 
 
Figure 9: Share of Three Top Companies and Share of State Insurers 
             
 
 
Non life distribution in MENA tends to be dominated by direct sales and brokers while life 
insurance is divided between tied agents for individual business and brokers for group life. 
However  banc-assurance  is  now  also  becoming  a  significant  distribution  system, 
particularly in the Francophone countries (Annex Table 6).  Insurers have had relationships 
with banks for some time, largely to place industrial risks for bank-funded projects, but this 
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assurance is only formally regulated in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, and Tunisia. It accounts 
for 95% of the sales of the major life insurers in Egypt (on a non annual equivalence basis), 70% 
of life and assistance sales in Morocco and close to 30% of all insurance sales in Lebanon. In 
other Francophone countries such as Algeria, banc-assurance is also beginning to appear, with 
the three dominant state-owned insurers all having established deals with the major state-owned 
banks. The first bancassurance arrangement was recently agreed in UAE. 
 
The relationships with banks may provide other channels for the growth of the insurance 
sector.  Insurance premiums will grow with the requirement for borrowers to insure cars and 
other goods purchased with personal loans.  Mortgage lending is still not well developed in the 
MENA  region,  but  for  those  countries  where  mortgage  markets  are  developing,  mortgage 
insurance can be driven by lending.  In addition, there is generally a greater trust of banks than 
insurers in emerging markets and savings and investment products sold via bank branches are 
often more acceptable to the consumer.   
 
Outside  the  Francophone  zone  there  is  a  growing  link  between  Islamic  banking  and 
Takaful insurers.  In the GCC, Bahrain has specifically supported the development of banc-
assurance and new arrangements are appearing in the UAE. 
4.2. Signs of Excessive Fragmentation in MENA’s Insurance Markets  
 
MENA’s insurance markets seem excessively fragmented in some countries and this may 
have also hindered the sector’s development.  There seem to be too many companies sharing 
very small markets.  As a result, insurance companies seem unable to generate scale, retain a 
sufficient  volume  of  premiums,  build  meaningful  risk  pools  and  underwriting  capacity,  and 
innovate.  Many insurance companies seem to act simply as brokers or front offices, reinsuring 
most of the business.   The volume and levels  of human capital  also  remains  weak in  most 
countries, also hindering the sector‟s development.   
 
A number of key indicators suggest that most countries are experiencing a serious problem 
of overcapacity, both in terms of capital and number of competitors.  As shown in Table 6, 
the average ratio of net premiums (gross premium minus reinsurance fees) to capital is only 78% 
in MENA, significantly lower than the average ratio in the OECD (310%).  The MENA ratios 
reflect the abundant availability of capital in MENA, and the significant entry of new companies 
in insurance markets despite relatively high capital requirements and the small size of these 
markets.  The global insurance pricing cycle has shown that excess capital can lead to predatory 
price competition, particularly in lines of business such as MTPL, medical and small property 
risks.  The reported loss ratios in MTPL and other lines tend to confirm this syndrome (see 










Table 6: Indicators of Industry Capacity Utilization 
Country  Net Premium/Capital
9 
(%) 






Capital US $mill. 
Algeria  N/A  1.4  67  2.3 
Bahrain  105  0.1  57  13.3 
Egypt  75  2.4  49  10.6 
Jordan  83  0.4  60  11.3 
KSA  106  0.3  64  26.7 
Kuwait  38  0.1  N/A  17.4 
Lebanon  185  0.2  72  1.5 
Libya  53  0.2  50  7.5 
Morocco  74  4.5  84  5.5 
Oman  89  0.1  48  13.0 
Qatar  32  0.2  43  10.0 
Syria  98  1.5  N/A  15.4 
Tunisia  52  1.0  67  7.0 
UAE  55  0.2  55  27.3 
Yemen  56  0.0  30  2.0 
MENA  78  0.8  57  11.4 
OECD  310  1.6  83  5.9 
Emerging  -  -  -  4.4 
 
The low average premium per insurer in MENA also  suggests an excessive number of 
players.   As shown in Table 6, the average ratio of gross premium per insurer (adjusted for per 
capita income) is half of the average ratio in the OECD, and some individual countries have 
extremely low ratios.  On the basis of this measure there is a clear dichotomy, with some Arabian 
Peninsula countries having issued too many licenses given potential demand.  Combined with 
heavy  minimum  capital  requirements  this  can  lead  to  either  excessive  competition  or  the 
existence of faux fronting
10 insurers that are really brokers and/or investment houses in disguise 
(see Box below). 
 
Finally, the average retention  ratio  (ratio of net premium to gross  premium) is  low in 
MENA,  suggesting  lack  of  underwriting  capacity
11  and the presence of brokers and/or 
investment houses in disguise among licensed insurers.  A retention ratio of zero suggests that 
the company is essentially a broker, while a retention ratio of one indicates that the company is 
doing  traditional  insurance.    Only  a  few  MENA  countries  have  retention  ratios  close  to  70 
percent  or  above.    This  reflects  to  some  extent  market  fragmentation,  as  the  retention  ratio 
increases more than proportionately with size.  Small companies do not have the capacity to 
build adequate risk pools, take risk internally, underwrite contracts, and innovate.  Therefore, the 
current market fragmentation may have been one of the key factors hindering the development of 
the sector in the MENA region.   
                                                           
9 The Egyptian figure is overstated as a significant part of premiums represent single premium investment contracts. 
10 Much of the original fronting was carried out legitimately by captives of major international firms engaged in the 
extractive industries and seeking international capacity.   This is becoming a less relevant sub sector under non 
admitted insurance rules and with the larger local insurers tending to handle this business (albeit with low 
retentions). 
11 The apparent contradiction between high minimum capital levels and limited capacity reflects the very large peak 
risks in the region associated with the extractive and refining sectors and tourism related construction activities. 17 
 
Box 2:  How many insurers?  
 
While fronting is legitimate for highly specialized peak risks, if it is the entire activity of an 
insurer  there  must  be  questions  as  to  whether  the  entity  is  really  a  broker  in  disguise.    A 
syndrome found in a number of MENA countries involves a large number of small insurers 
owned by family-controlled financial and industrial groups. These groups write business from 
their affiliates and pass on the risk to international re-insurers who actually do the underwriting.  
These affiliates often receive generous fronting commissions (typically 5% to 15%) and are able 
to maintain small overhead costs. Where capital is plentiful, as in a number of GCC countries, 
such  structures  lend  themselves  to  becoming  essentially  investment  vehicles  providing 
employment for members of the controlling families. This in turn adds to supervisory load.  In 
such a rich capital environment, a strategy of rationalizing the sector by increasing minimum 
capital requirements is likely to fail.  
 
A new source of small insurers has been the blossoming of interest in Takaful insurers in the 
MENA region. A number of these are associated with Islamic banks.  These insurers can be 
justified  if  they  open  new  markets  but  can  add  to  excess  competition  if  they  are  merely 
competing with an already adequate number of established market players.  This tends to be the 
case  in  the  non  life  and  health  sub  sectors.    Takaful  probably  has  more  of  a  genuine 
developmental role to play in the life („Family Insurance‟) sub sector if outstanding Shariah 
issues can be resolved. 
4.3. Lack of Professional Skills in the Industry 
 
The lack of qualified professionals has also hindered the development of the insurance 
sector in MENA.  This arises from the fact that some countries have been through periods of 
nationalization  and  are  now  liberalizing,  others  were  in  practice  dominated  by  brokers  (or 
fronting  insurers)  and  some  were  treating  insurers  as  investment  companies.  Most  MENA 
countries now have updated insurance laws and supervisory regimes and have begun to realize 
the benefits of running insurers correctly as risk underwriters.  This is placing enormous strains 
on the available skill base and in some cases leading to income disparities that can discourage 
investment in training by players and supervisory offices (as they will immediately lose the staff 
concerned). Numerous small insurers are „key man dependent‟. 
 
The lack of technical skills can be illustrated by pointing out that only 2 MENA countries, 
Egypt  and  Lebanon,  are  represented  in  the  85  Full  and  Associate  members  of  the 
International  Actuarial  Association.    However  even  between  these  two  there  is  only  one 
Fellowship  level  IAA  accredited  consultant  under  the  age  of  60  in  active  practice.      Most 
countries  require  actuarial  determination  of  life  mathematical  reserves  and  there  will  be  an 
increasing need to apply actuarial techniques to long tail claims provisioning (and MTPL in 
particular) to avoid the periodic formation of cash flow pyramids.  The lack of skills is also 
chronic  in  the  areas  of  accounting  and  auditing  (see  the  section  on  regulation  below). 
While foreign insurers,  expatriate  management and reinsurers  can  take on part of the 
training role there is an urgent need for local capacity. The challenge is well appreciated 
throughout the region and regional centers of excellence are beginning to emerge, with Bahrain 
taking on the leadership in basic insurance training in the Middle East through BIBF (which has 18 
 
translated  CII  diploma  and  certificate  level  material  into  Arabic  under  a  partnership 
arrangement),  IFID  having  a  similar  role  on  the  Maghreb  and  Cairo  University  producing 
approximately  30  actuarial  graduates  each  year  under  a  partnership  arrangement  with  Kent 
University in the UK.  Approximately 10% of these go on to do the UK professional exams
12 and 
as a practical expedient Associates of the leading international actuarial bodies with some years 
of experience are now being certified to do actuarial work. 
 





Minimum  capital  requirements  in  MENA  are  in  most  cases  high  by  international 
standards,  but  this  has  not  prevented  entry  in  a  capital  rich  region.  Minimum  capital 
requirements are a traditional supervisory tool to screen the number and quality of applicants in 
insurance and other sectors, but as noted above, in MENA it has not prevented a situation of 
excessive number of insurers in some markets, some of which are playing only a marginal role.   
 
Licensing  requirements  in  most  MENA  countries  generally  follow  international  norms, 
including  a  business  plan  and  fit  and  proper  information  on  the  senior  management.  
However, fit and proper information on Board directors and owners is less frequently required.   
It is also unclear why these fit and proper rules have not been able to screen applicants more 
effectively and prevent the entry of insurers which may not be able to play a meaningful role in 
the  marketplace.    Also,  most  MENA  countries  allow  composites  to  operate  but  enforced 
separation of assets and accounts is not always required. 
 
Licensing requirements include several restrictions on cross-shareholdings, branches, and 
foreign investments.  Some MENA countries apply limits to cross shareholdings (e.g. banks in 
Algeria may not hold more than 15% of an insurer) and to the amount that can be held by any 
one entity (e.g. 40% in Syria).  In addition a number of MENA countries do not allow branches 
to be established (Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Qatar, KSA, Syria, Tunisia) and/or still restrict the 
percentage  of  a  local  insurer  that  can  be  held  by  non  nationals  (Table  7).  Some  of  these 
restrictions may be justified for prudential reasons, while others seem questionable.   
 
Table 7:  Limits on foreign shareholdings in insurers  






















Sources: AXCO and WB on site research 
 
                                                           




Mandatory  insurance  lines  have  been  a  significant  source  of  growth  for  the  insurance 
sector in many emerging markets.  Motor third party liability (MTPL) insurance is typically 
the first insurance class to be made compulsory in most countries. This is often followed by other 
liability coverage where the general public is exposed to the risk of enterprises, with Contractors 
All Risks (CAR), various public transport risks, and certain professional liabilities being the 
most typical. 
 
The number of mandatory insurance lines has been growing in MENA, although they are 
still limited and not always effectively enforced.  MTPL insurance is now compulsory in all 
MENA countries.  However, this line of insurance is not effectively enforced in many MENA 
countries  as  noted  above.    In  addition  to  MTPL  insurance,  the  most  common  mandatory 
requirements  in  MENA  are  workman‟s  compensation  (WCA),  and  insurance  brokers  and 
medical  professional  indemnity  (PI).    CAR  is  required  in  some  MENA  countries  where 
government projects are involved but is not always enforced.   
 
Some GCC countries have introduced compulsory health insurance for expatriates.  This is 
meeting an important social objective and should boost premiums and the growth of the sector.  
Libya has recently announced that compulsory health insurance for all residents will be provided 
through the market.  Kuwait has  a blended voluntary  system  for  expatriates  with  the private 
insurers acting as distributers. It is now planning a single specialist health insurer (owned jointly 




MENA countries have exercise preferences in three major ways: (i) mandatory placements of 
certain risks with government insurers or locally owned insurers; (ii) mandatory placements of 
reinsurance  cessions  to  local  or  regional  insurers;  and  (iii)  placements  of  in  house  risks  to 
insurers owned by industrial groups (which in turn are often controlled by family groups).  Table 
8 describes mandated placements in selected countries. 
 
Government business still tends to be placed with insurers in which the government has a 
significant interest, but this is gradually breaking down (Table 8).  Mandatory placement of 
government  business  in  declining  as  governments  realize  the  benefits  to  be  obtained  from 
modern risk management technology available through the international brokers, and the fact 
that they have been cross subsidizing loss making classes. 
 
Forced coinsurance and facultative placement within local markets to maximize use of local 
capacity is also losing favor, largely because of the difficulties of keeping track of peak and 
catastrophe  risk  accumulations  and  increasingly  stringent  rules  placed  by  reinsurers  on  the 
capacity allocated to such business.  A more effective means of raising local capacity is to reduce 





Table 8: Mandated Placements and Preferences 
Country  Rules 
Algeria  Compulsory shares of the premium ceded must be placed with the CCR (the state reinsurer), such as 
10% for industrial, chemical, petrochemical, mechanical, and electronic, and 5% for other cessions.   
All compulsory catastrophic risk is reinsured through CCR.  
KSA  Mandatory 30% cession to local reinsurers unless a waiver is obtained. 
Morocco  10% obligatory cession to SCR (the state reinsurer) of some non life classes.  This is to be removed in 
the next few years. Facultative loss reserves due from foreign reinsurers have to be held locally. 
Qatar  Risks arising from government owned energy enterprises must be placed with local insurers. A tri-
annual tender is held. 
Syria  Compulsory shares of premium ceded must be placed with the UAR (the state reinsurer).  Additional 
facultative placements must first be offered to AUR and at least 2 other local insurers. 
Source:  AXCO and WB on site research 
Solvency, guarantee funds and wind up 
 
The solvency regime in most MENA countries broadly follows the original EU Solvency 1 
regime, with some countries modifying the premium and claims weightings according to 
the class of business.  Two countries (Jordan and Syria) have adopted a modified US risk based 
capital  approach,  which  implicitly  allows  for  a  graduated  response  to  deteriorating  insurer 
solvency.  KSA has also implemented such an approach in the context of a modified European 
solvency formula.  Two countries (Lebanon and Oman) have flat solvency requirements that are 
low by international standards and one country (Yemen) has no solvency requirement.   
 
A number of countries have old fashioned general reserve requirements, often related to 
minimum capital, presumably a carry-over from an earlier generation of regulation.  As a 
result, minimum capital has taken on a default solvency role in some countries, although its main 
purpose should be to help create an efficient industry structure and cover establishment costs.  In 
the case of Takaful operators, most MENA countries have specified modified minimum capital 
requirements,  as  they  have  for  pure  mutual  insurers.    Bahrain  has  instituted  an  interesting 
approach  which  allows  a  Takaful  fund  5  years  to  build  up  adequate  risk  capital  before  the 
operator is required to provide funds from its own resources. 
 
Reserving (a significantly more important issue than solvency margins) tends to be rules-
based where it is premium related, but most countries apply a principles based approach to 
claims provisions.  This can undermine the solvency regime if the reserves are not determined 
by  qualified  individuals  who  can  adjust  for  inadequate  case  estimates  and  incurred  but  not 
reported claims.  Some more modern laws such as in KSA and Egypt require actuarial input for 
long tail (i.e. liability) claims provisions.  Life mathematical reserves almost inevitably require 
actuarial input. 
 
Wind-up rules in the region tend to assume liquidation rather than earlier interventions. 
However,  regulations  in  some  countries  such  as  the  UAE  do  allow  for  enforced  portfolio 
transfers and pragmatism under general powers has been applied in cases where insurers have 
failed and where specific powers have not been present.  An increasingly common response to 
wind  up  risk  has  been  to  require  that  insurers  establish  joint  policyholder  protection  funds, 
usually with an annual levy of between 0.5% and 1% being applied to premium incomes. 
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Accounting and Auditing Standards 
 
A  majority  of  MENA  countries  still  follow  national  accounting  standards  although  an 
increasing number require listed companies and banks to follow IFRS.  However, many 
insurance  companies  are  non-listed,  and  the  frequent  presence  of  family  and  financial  and 
industrial groups in the insurance sector raises a number of transparency and governance issues 
(e.g. related party transactions).  Therefore, the standards and the level of professional oversight 
will need to be strengthened if non-listed financial sector insurers are to gain public trust.  
 
The quality of accounting and auditing is limited by lack of skills in these areas.  Most 
MENA countries have undergraduate level accounting programs and the big 4 international firms 
(which are present in most MENA countries) have active in house training programs offering 
ACCA accreditation. However they have limited resources relative to the specialized demands of 
the insurance sector. This has led to a situation where sole traders are being authorized to carry 
out audits of insurers.  This is an absurdity as a full modern insurance audit requires governance 
and internal controls/ risk management overview and requires at least a week and a team of 
experts, including systems specialists – in practice the sole traders sometimes sign off on the 
work of larger firms.  It is also noteworthy that some accounting bodies in MENA countries are 




As  noted  above,  only  a  few  countries  have  formally  regulated  banc-assurance,  but  an 
increasing  number  of  countries  are  aware  of  the  importance  of  the  relevant  market 
conduct issues.  Some countries are taking a careful line with Kuwait and Qatar forbidding 
banks from accepting commissions from insurers and Egypt effectively placing a temporary ban 
on new arrangements until an acceptable set of rules is agreed.  In Jordan new rules allowing for 
banc-assurance have recently been promulgated although there is some resistance from leading 
agency  based  insurers.  Oman  has  also  introduced  formal  requirements,  although  these  are 
principles rather than rules based. In the absence of specific rules the bank regulators in most 
MENA jurisdictions have banned bundling of bank and insurance products, which is in line with 
emerging international best practice. The handling of long term insurance classes in particular 
need enhanced market conduct rules as consumers can otherwise believe that they are purchasing 




The main issue addressed in regional consumer protection requirements is recourse in the 
event of disputed claims.  A number of countries require that insurers have internal dispute 
resolution mechanisms in place and most jurisdictions specify that the insurance supervisor is the 
next step if resolution cannot be achieved.  As shown in Table 9, a few MENA countries have set 
up  alternative  dispute  resolution  procedures  including  mediation  and  arbitration  mechanisms 
(although the latter are more applicable to commercial coverages as personal lines policies rarely 




Table 9: Alternative dispute mechanism initiatives in MENA 
Country  Mechanism 
Syria  Insurance dispute resolution committee within supervisor with ombudsman powers 
Qatar  The Ministry of Business and Trade has ombudsman powers. 
Oman  The supervisor has issued code of practice for insurers and acts as mediator. 
Lebanon  Insurance arbitration council for motor and medical claims under US$50,000. 
Jordan  Insurance Disputes Resolution Committee has ombudsman powers up to US$35,000 
Source: World Bank country visits and AXCO Reports 
Tax policy 
 
Insurers  in  MENA  are  subject  to  direct  taxes,  levies  to  support  supervisors  (generally 
significantly  less  than  1%  of  turnover)  and  levies  to  fund  guarantee  funds/  nominal 
defendants.  Tax regimes are illustrated in Table 10.  While the taxes on non life classes are high 
in some cases, they are not out of alignment with those in industrial countries.  A more serious 
issue is the turnover taxes applied to life insurance premiums and zakat applied to policyholder 
funds.  These are a direct penalty on the savings components of mainstream products such as 
endowment  assurance,  and  the  whole  of  life  and  universal  life.    The  economic  reasons  for 
introducing such taxes are hard to fathom.  Algeria applies a combined VAT and premium tax of 
19% to all insurance classes, including life. This more than any other factor probably accounts 
for  the  virtual  non  existence  of  a  genuine  long  term  life  insurance  sector  in  that  country. 
Similarly a 3.25% tax on capitalization policies in Morocco has effectively killed that market. 
 
Table 10:  Significant Premium Taxes in MENA (Selected Cases) 
Country  VAT/ GST  Stamp Duty  Premium Tax  Other 
Algeria  17% on all classes- 
including life 
5% prem.  MTPL   2% on all classes – including life   
Egypt      1% life, 5% non life except mandatory 
insurance 
 
Jordan  16% of all non life 
except PA/ med 
1% prem.  all 
classes  
   
Lebanon      5% non marine, 3% marine  6% municipal 
tax -  non life 
Syria    3% prem.  all 
classes 
  5%  prem. all 
classes 
Tunisia      10% prem.  all non life except export 
focused, agriculture and decennial 
5% on marine and aviation 
 
Source: AXCO and country visits 
 
5.2. The Supervisory Framework  
 
Many insurance supervisors in MENA do not enjoy adequate levels of legal, administrative 
and budgetary independence.  As shown in Table 11, insurance supervision is still conducted 
by units inside government ministries in eight MENA countries.  Very rarely, these units or 
departments operate with sufficient administrative autonomy and have the conditions to attract 
and retain qualified personnel.  Morocco is probably one of the few exceptions in this regard, but 
Morocco is also passing a new law introducing a new and independent insurance supervisor 23 
 
agency.    Some  countries  have  instituted  a  separate  supervisory  agency  (e.g.  Jordan,  Syria, 
Tunisia), some countries have placed insurance supervision inside the central bank (Bahrain, 
Saudi Arabia), and other countries have merged insurance supervision with the capital market 
authority or other non-banking regulators (Egypt, Oman).   
 
Table 11: Insurance Supervision Structures in MENA 
Country  Supervisor 
Algeria  Ministry of Finance 
Bahrain  Central Bank of Bahrain 
Egypt  Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority 
Jordan  Insurance Commission 
KSA  Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority 
Kuwait  Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
Lebanon  Ministry of Commerce 
Libya  Public Committee for Economy Trade and Investment 
Morocco  Ministry of Finance 
Oman  Capital Market Authority 
Qatar  Ministry of Business and Trade 
Syria  Syrian Insurance Supervisory Commission 
Tunisia  Comité General des Assurances 
UAE  Ministry of Economy Planning  
Yemen  Ministry of Industry and Trade 
 
Supervisory capacity varies considerably over the region.  Leading established supervisory 
jurisdictions include Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia.  Egypt and Libya are in transition in 
parallel with their market liberalization programs. These countries have all benefited from strong 
government  support.  Newly  formalized  markets  that  have  rapidly  demonstrated  a  strong 
intervention capacity include KSA and Syria although these countries  are still building their 
resources and supervisory models. Most catch up work is required in some oil and gas rich 
countries where to date insurance development has been seen as a secondary issue.  
 
At the same time, Financial Sector Assessments (FSAPs) conducted by the World Bank and 
the IMF in MENA countries have identified several common weaknesses in supervisory 
practices:  
 
  Weak financial reporting – problems in obtaining consistent, accurate and timely statistical, 
financial and reinsurance information;   
  Lack of adequate enforcement of claims provisions and premium levels for MTPL insurance; 
  Lack of early intervention and enforcement actions at industry and insurer levels;  
  Weak corporate governance; 
  Problems  in  dealing  with  illegal  and  excessive  payments  to  agents  and  brokers  while 
allowing them to operate commercially; 
  Problems ensuring that bancassurance products and distribution rules meet adequate market 
conduct standards; 
  Lack of functional consumer protection mechanisms;  24 
 
  Absence of transparent and informative web windows to the public – Egypt, Morocco, and 
Jordan provide good examples of web sites that provide useful information to the public and 
the sector; 
  No provisions for wind up or bankruptcy under the insurance supervisor and limited legal 
protection of policyholders in such circumstances; 
  Dealing with Takaful – in practice most supervisors to date have applied normal supervisory 
methodologies, while allowing a Shariah board to deal with product issues (see Appendix). 
 
Insurance industry associations are still underutilized.  The World Bank‟s work in the region 
has shown that strong industry bodies, working closely with the supervisor and government can 
have a significant impact on public trust and awareness, and in ensuring that the sector operates 
in an optimal fashion (i.e. properly balances competition and the public good).  Best practice 
case studies can be found in Syria and Morocco (see case study below).  
6. Stages of Insurance Development in MENA: A Preliminary Classification  
 
The analysis above enables the identification of three broad groups of emergent markets in 
MENA as well as one relatively unique case (Lebanon).  These groups include:
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Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia: These countries have been able to develop the insurance sector at 
a faster pace. Supervisory and regulatory capacity is generally more developed. The industry is 
led by the private sector – government control is non-existent or minor and concentration levels 
are not excessively high (the Jordanian market appears a little fragmented and may need some 
consolidation).  Bancassurance  may  have  contributed  to  the  growth  of  the  life  sector,  while 
cultural  factors  do  not  seem  to  have  hindered  excessively  the  growth  of  the  sector
14.  The 
industry in these countries is overcapitalized, but capital usage is more efficient than elsewhere 
and the sector contains an efficient number of insurers. Retention levels are still low by 
international standards (except for Morocco) but are not unreasonable for emerging markets with 
large peak risks and undeveloped household markets.   
 
Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Syria:  These countries have insurance sectors that are in transition 
from  long  periods  of  nationalization.    They  tend  to  have  reasonably  efficient  numbers  of 
competitors  but  high  levels  of  concentration,  reflecting  dominant  market  shares  for  the 
government insurers in some lines such as government property, MAT and extractive industry, 
as  well  as  retail  lines  such  as  MTPL,  where  under-pricing  and  losses  have  been  chronic. 
Retention levels tend to be higher than for the more conventional markets reflecting abnormally 
high levels of capitalization and residual government guarantees.   
 
Bahrain, KSA, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, UAE:  These resource rich GCC countries have very small 
populations  (KSA  excepted),  significant  numbers  of  expatriates,  high  average  income  and 
generous social transfer systems.  They are anxious to diversify their income bases, and look for 
this in the financial services, education, tourism, and property sectors. They tend to have too 
                                                           
13 Yemen is a low income country and its industry structure reflects limited demand and scale.  The major insurer is 
associated with the leading local trading group and as would be expected, local retention levels are low. 
14 Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia entered this market first in MENA, with French technical assistance. 25 
 
many insurers for the size of their markets, although with the exception of UAE and KSA
15, 
concentration levels are at healthy levels (implying two tier systems with relatively efficient 
leaders and numerous small fronting, struggling or inactive insurers).  Retention levels average 
50%, reflecting a compromise between relatively high capitalization and a number of very large 
peak risks.  In contrast to UAE, Qatar has a strong preference system and 95% of premium is 
placed with  the 3 largest national insurers, exacerbating the competitive level amongst the 
smaller players.  The Kuwaiti government self insures which effectively puts a good part of 
potential premium flows out of the reach of the market
16.   
 
Lebanon:  Lebanon has had an unregulated market for over 60 years and has provided much of 
the  insurance  expertise  and  investment  in  the  Levant  and  KSA  as  new  formally  regulated 
markets have opened up
17.  The insurance legislation is very outdated and the supervisor has had 
to cope with a hostile sector in trying to introduce a modern risk based approach
18.  Low entry 
requirements led to a fragmented and marginally efficient structure (including a significant 
number of inoperative licenses and „brokers in disguise‟).  At the same time, the industry has 
benefited from business from contiguous countries such as Syria and from a health system with 
large coverage gaps.  However these sources of business offer limited scope for future growth 
and some insurers are considering moving to other countries with stronger supervisory regimes.   
 
 
7. The Case of Morocco 
 
Morocco should have one of the lowest insurance penetration levels in MENA given its 
income level and demographics.  Instead, it is the clear out-performer in the region.  While 
there are still a number of issues to be addressed in Morocco, the following factors help explain 
why the country has been able to develop the insurance sector at a faster pace:  
 
  A capable supervisory office enjoying a relatively unique working relationship between its 
counterparts in the government and the industry; 
  A regulatory regime that has tracked EU developments
19 and supports a technical approach 
to insurance management; 
  A private-led insurance sector, and the regulator willingness to allow significant (and high 
quality) foreign holdings in leading local insurers; 
  A stable and effective industry structure following a series of mergers; 
  The existence of well regulated and policed mandatory insurance classes – including motor 
third party liability, workman‟s compensation (WCA), some professional liability coverage, 
and mortgage related coverage;   
  The historical role the sector has played in providing comprehensive health insurance;  
                                                           
15 The KSA and the UAE have recently been discouraging applicants for new licenses. 
16 This is likely to gradually change under a proposed privatization program. 
17 KSA had a largely unregulated and poorly regarded market until 2007 when the system was formalized and 
supervision put under SAMA.  It has since made rapid progress. 
18 A well reviewed best practice draft law has been awaiting submission to parliament for more than 4 years. 
19 However the Moroccan supervisor plans to carefully assess the applicability of Solvency II and the planned IFRS 
4 update to an emerging market context. 26 
 
  The  rapid  emergence  and  growth  of  life  banc-assurance  with  a  significant  savings 
component; 
  A significant role for life insurers in the provision of supplementary pensions; 
  A developing mortgage market; 
  A  still  developing  but  viable  capital  market,  supplemented  by  some  scope  to  diversify 
portfolios internationally (10% of  funds off-shore). 
  Removal  of  nearly  all  risk  placement  preferences,  with  the  last  remaining  compulsory 
cession to the national reinsurer due to be removed shortly. 
 
The next phase of the partnership between the industry and the government involves a 
‘Contrat Programme’, which was officially launched early in 2010.  This entails a document 
laying out the commitments and roles of the various parties.  The contract has been coordinated 
by the Ministry of Finance and as a starting point a report was commissioned from a consortium 
of an American consulting firm and a French actuarial practice, that lists 75 measures covering 
product development, compulsory classes, prudential controls, investment rules, internal controls 
and risk management, internationalization and an implementation process.   
8.  Roadmap for Developing the Insurance Sector in MENA 
 
As shown in the preceding sections, the factors affecting insurance development in MENA can 
be broadly divided into those which are out of control of policy makers and those that can be 
influenced by policy actions.  Moreover, some of the obstacles to market development can only 
be dealt with over a considerable length of time, while others can be addressed over shorter time 
periods. Within this broad policy framework, the sections below provide recommendations for 
the development of the insurance sector in MENA.  It goes without saying that the following 
recommendations will need tailoring to the conditions prevailing in each jurisdiction.  Some 
countries may already be well advanced in implementing a number of these headings. 
8.1. Introducing additional compulsory insurance and enforcing the existing ones 
 
There is some justification for introducing compulsory insurance that generates positive 
externalities and supports fiscal rectitude.  Most MENA countries make employers liable for 
injuries and illnesses in the workplace but not all require mandatory insurance when there is no 
social  insurance  mechanism  in  place.  The  introduction  of  such  a  requirement  would  both 
substantially increase premiums and generate a social good.  Other classes of insurance that 
would have these dual benefits include the liabilities of enterprises that interact with the general 
public  including  construction  companies,  public  transport  providers  and  certain  professions.  
Catastrophe insurance is another category of insurance that is being made compulsory in some 
countries outside MENA, particularly when associated with the exposures to natural disasters of 
credit grantors (e.g. mortgage lenders).  Some GCC countries could consider introducing health 
insurance  for  expatriates  and  eventually,  as  fiscal  pressures  rise,  to  their  own  domestic 
populations (as has already recently happened in Libya).  
 
There  is  also  scope  for  generating  more  premium  revenues  and  growth  from  existing 
compulsory  insurance  lines.    This  is  the  case  of  MTPL  and  Contractors  All  Risk  (CAR) 27 
 
insurance.  Again, enforcement would not only result in larger premiums but could also provide 
additional  benefits,  such  as  reduced  accidents  and  injuries:  the  regulatory  section  provides 
further details.  
 
A desirable associated developmental step is increasing consumer awareness of insurance 
and its role. This should be a joint industry governmental program to educate the public about 
the role of insurance and to generate greater trust in the sector. The implementation of effective 
consumer recourse mechanisms are an intrinsic part of such a program. 
8.2. Reducing the share of State-owned Insurers 
 
As shown above, research shows that reducing the participation of state insurers would 
contribute to faster market development.  A number of MENA countries are still dealing with 
the  legacy  of  heavy  state  involvement  in  the  insurance  sector  and  working  through  the 
liberalization process, including Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Syria.  A prerequisite for effective 
liberalization is the establishment of an effective prudential regime and an adequate consumer 
protection and education infrastructure.  In addition, human resources need to be developed in 
accounting, investment, actuarial, underwriting, and claims assessment.  Moreover, state insurers 
may  need  to  go  through  full  financial  and  operating  audits  and  plans  developed  for 
corporatization and eventual privatization.  Putting state owned insurers onto a full market basis 
may take years and different models can be applied to the eventual privatization.  In MENA a 
common approach has been to introduce private shareholders through direct placement (STAR in 
Tunisia) and/or an IPO (Libya Insurance in Libya).   




Licensing rules should be more rigorous in examining the fit and proper status of directors 
and owners of insurers.  In addition supervisors should be allowed to consider the impact of 
issuing new licenses on the stability and development of the market.  In MENA this may prove 
more effective in ensuring the entry of applicants able to contribute to market development than 
minimum capital requirements. As a general rule branches of foreign companies should only be 
allowed  if  assets  covering  liabilities  and  required  solvency  are  held  locally  and  the  parent 
company has very high claims paying and credit ratings. 
 
Consolidation of Market Structure 
 
MENA supervisors should also consider measures to consolidate the industry and remove 
weak and small players that generate losses and do not contribute to market development. 
A common theme in MENA countries is too many small insurers (including Takaful funds and 
managers).  The most common approach to forcing consolidation in other markets has been to 
raise minimum capital, but this approach may not prove effective in MENA. One potentially 
more powerful technique used in some countries is to give the supervisor the power to encourage 
the exit of faux market players by requiring all insurers to satisfy certain minimum efficiency 
and  legitimacy  conditions.    Aside  from  the  enforcement  of  prudential  requirements  (having 
adequate provisions and reserves in particular) these can include a requirement that minimum 28 
 
market shares be achieved within a reasonable period in mandatory lines such as MTPL and 
medical (and thereafter sustained), and that a minimum aggregate premium retention level of say 
30% to 40% be maintained (to remove the disguised brokers).  Finally, the insurance sector 
could be required to publish efficiency benchmarks, such as premium per employee, combined 
ratio and net expense ratio. 
 
Box 3:  Competition – why insurance is different from banking 
 
There is a large amount of empirical evidence that scale economies apply to the insurance sector 
up to a relatively large size of operation.  For non life insurance this is partly an overhead 
spreading issue but the credibility of claims data also increases (roughly to the square root of the 
number of claims) with size.  Thus large non life insurers can price more accurately.  Smaller 
insurers often follow the leaders‟ pricing structures and attempt to compete on some other basis. 
Unfortunately there is little credible data in new insurance markets and insurers will typically not 
know  the  real  cost  of  their  product  for  some  years.    Thus  under  the  pressure  of  too  many 
competitors it is relatively easy for insurers to under-price and undermine the financial position 
of the whole sector (consumers tend to be efficient at finding the cheapest insurance price). This 
will be exacerbated if investment returns are high and some insurers believe that they can cover 
underwriting losses. Under-pricing combined with under-reserving leads to prolonged disputes 
and settlement delays and adversely affects the development of the sector.  
For  life  insurers  scale  is  important  because  of  the  enormous  investment  that  is  required  in 
building and retaining marketing and distribution capacity (typically up to 70% of total costs). 
Thus a start up life insurer can expect to be making accounting losses for some time, even if its 
intrinsic value (i.e. NPV) is increasing.  However the underlying processes tend to be more stable 




While  the  IAIS  insurance  core  principles  require  that  life  and  non  life  activities  are 
preferably  handled  in  separately  licensed  entities  (to  pre-empt  cross  subsidies  and 
adequately secure the assets covering life insurance policy liabilities) there is an exception if 
the supervisory authority is ‘satisfied that the insurer has satisfactory processes requiring 
that risks be handled separately on both going concern and winding up bases’.  If MENA 
supervisors  decide  to  grandfather  the  existing  composites  (for  example  to  leverage  limited 
human resources), it is essential that the life insurance assets are clearly identified, cannot be 
charged or lent, are held by a custodian and are otherwise completely ring fenced.  
 
Solvency regimes and guarantee funds 
 
A desirable approach  to developing a risk based  supervisory  model  is  to initially  have 
relatively simple but modern solvency requirements and first focus on ensuring that proper 
information is being provided.  It is also essential to ensure that supervisors‟ analytical and 
intervention capacity is up to necessary standards.  Developing markets that have taken this 
approach  typically  seek  technical  assistance  in  producing  relevant  operating  manuals  and  in 
performing the initial full scope on site inspections.  Supplementary general reserve requirements 
where they exist bear no relationship to an insurer‟s risk levels and would be better replaced with 29 
 
some simple weightings related to asset structures.  While actuarial resources are thin on the 
ground in most MENA countries a more rules based approach could be taken to the setting of 
non  life  claims  provisions,  including  IBNR  allowances.  Long  tail  claims  (MTPL  aside)  are 
infrequent and reinsurer support could be sought here.  
 
Guarantee funds, other than for compulsory insurances and life insurance in the absence of 
strong ring fencing requirements (see composites) should be discouraged as they create 
moral hazard in the absence of strong risk based supervisory regimes.  A better approach is 
to ensure that policy provisions and reserves are properly matched by secured and appropriate 
assets and that the supervisor has the power to take prompt corrective action (including taking 
possession of assets and enforcing portfolio transfers) in the event an insurer gets into trouble. 
 
Bancassurance   
 
Bancassurance has the potential to produce a quantum jump in the penetration of long 
term insurance markets in all MENA countries. This is largely because this business model 
enables insurers to short circuit the time it takes the population to understand their role and gain 
trust in their products.  Thus a delicate balance needs to be achieved between the comfort the 
bank provides and the need for the consumer to understand that they are not buying a bank 
product. Best regulatory practices are being developed outside the region and some countries 
within  the  region  have  already  drawn  on  these.  One  possible  role  for regional  education  or 
development organizations is to develop a best practice set of rules that could be adapted to the 




A  number  of  innovative  approaches  that  efficiently  establish  ombudsman  or  near 
ombudsman  structures  within  existing  institutions  have  been  developed  within  newly 
emerging MENA insurance markets. In addition a number of countries require insurers to set 
up internal dispute resolution processes and attendant reporting.  These mechanisms recognize 




Policy makers and regulators must address the causes of limited premium generation in 
MTPL  insurance,  by  improving  compliance  (i.e.  through  more  aggressive  enforcement 
measures),  addressing  understatement  of  claims  provisions  by  insurers,  relaxing  price 
controls, and consolidating the industry.  There are a number of examples of innovative and 
strong actions that are being taken in some countries to deal with these issues.  For example,  
 
  Tunisia has introduced clear compensation guidelines for MTPL claims and enforced better 
claims settlement practices on the part of the insurers (including immediate settlement for 
claims below a defined level).  Results have already improved dramatically. 
  In  Egypt,  the  Egyptian  State  Insurance  Holding  Company,  working  with  the  supervisor 
(EFSA), has installed actuarial capacity to properly value outstanding claims provisions and 
this has been reflected in a series of significant increases in premium rates.  In addition Egypt 30 
 
has capped serious claims.  It is also considering options to establish a central statistical 
underwriting and claims database. 
  Saudi Arabia is building a professional MTPL claims assessment firm jointly owned by the 
insurers to prevent claims fraud and mis-allocation. Such firms can limit the need for police 
involvement except in the most serious accidents.  An alternative is to remove liability and 
allow individual drivers to claims against their insurer. 
  Syria  has  centralized  the  pricing  and  allocation  of  MTPL  renewals,  capped  claims  and 
applied  a  no  fault  approach  to  maximum  payouts.    It  is  about  to  introduce  electronic 





Possibly one of the most serious regulatory flaws in the region is the lack of consistent, 
timely  and high quality data available to supervisors and those sections of the general 
public and the industry who need such information.  This partly reflects the newness of some 
insurance markets and supervisory entities, but also is a manifestation of a desire by family and 
financial and industrial controlled groups to not reveal such information.  This attitude is not 
acceptable for financial institutions collecting funds from the public and taking on contractual 
liabilities and all insurers should be required to submit financial and statistical information to 
supervisors in electronic form according to agreed templates, timetables and definitions. If an 
insurer cannot accomplish this there are good reasons to question their ability to be in business. 
 
Supervisory structures and independence 
 
As insurance markets develop they gain political power and supervisors eventually need to 
be given the resources and independence to act according to the public good rather than 
the  requirements  of  special  interests.  As  noted,  one  solution  is  to  place  the  insurance 
supervisor in the central bank and this may be a next step for a number of supervisors in small 
MENA  countries.    An  alternative  is  to  establish  an  integrated  supervisor  with  independent 
funding sources and transparent appointment and removal processes for senior personnel. 
8.4. Improving the Tax Regime  
 
Many countries at all levels of development see the insurance sector as a reliable source of 
taxation revenues.  While the economics of this approach are questionable if direct taxation of 
premiums  become  egregious  (i.e.  the  premium  can  become  larger  than  the  potential 
policyholder‟s risk aversion) the ready availability of relatively reliable turnover numbers and an 
assumption that insurance is a luxury good often drives policy. In practice some level of taxation 
of risk premiums may be justified as value is being added, this is generally a small sum relative 
to the sum insured and claims payments are not taxed.  
 
However the taxation of the savings components of long term savings contracts (pensions 
and  life  insurance
20) is a direct attack on thrift and implicitly involves a supertax, as 
premiums are normally paid out of after tax income.   Increasingly policy is to tax any excess 
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of a cash surrender value over premiums paid when this is taken early (e.g in less than 8 years 
after policy inception).  Continued up front taxation of contractual savings implies a national 
policy of favoring the banking and securities sectors or an attempt to impose a narrowly focused 
wealth tax.  Neither of these policies has proved to be developmentally justified and a number of 
countries (e.g. Egypt) have ceased taxing life insurance premiums. 
8.5. Developing Takaful Insurance  
 
Takaful insurance is potentially a solution to make insurance acceptable to religious and 
cultural tradition.  However, several insurance sector officers and supervisors throughout 
the region believe that to date it is more of a marketing tool than a genuine attempt to 
create  a  product  that  is  consistent  with  Shariah  law.  The  KSA  has  recognized  this  by 
banning the use of the word Islamic in any insurer‟s branding. Numerous challenges still exist in 
creating  a  truly  Islamic  product  and  reconciling  this  with  modern  prudential  and  consumer 
protection requirements.  While there has been an extraordinary amount of publicity, discussion 
and licensing activity the Takaful sector still accounts for less  than 3% of  global insurance 
premiums and is still very much a minority subsector in MENA, although there has been rapid 
growth from a small base in some countries (The Appendix provides additional information).   
 
Operationalizing and harmonizing the principles of Takaful insurance remains a challenge.   
Licensing more Takaful insurers is likely to add to the supervisory load (possibly more than 
proportionately given the complexity of Takaful hybrid structures).  However, given the size of 
the  global  conservative  Islamic  population,  not  to  mention  non  Muslims  who  prefer  mutual 
structures, and the increasing evidence of the role of insurance in development, there is much to 
be said for persevering. However the current fragmented global approach is not helping, with 
numerous interpretations and hybrid structures, a number of which are replicas of traditional 
commercial insurance structures.  For this reason, there is much to be said for a more rigorous 
and coordinated approach to developing a genuinely acceptable model.  This in turn may involve 
greater centralization of Shariah guidance, new structures for the capital support required by 
modern risk based prudential standards and innovative approaches to consumer protection. 
8.6. Developing Human Capital 
 
While  the  lack  of  technical  skills  issue  is  widely  appreciated  throughout  the  MENA 
region
21, especially as technical underwriting becomes more important in an uncertain 
investment climate, there has been little regional cooperation.  In fact a number of countries 
appear to be trying to become the regional center of excellence in a number of disciplines when 
leadership has already been de facto established. 
 
The IFID and Bahrain (insurance skills and knowledge) and Egyptian (creating a stream of 
candidates for IAA level qualification) models have already created potential centers of 
excellence in the Maghreb and Middle East and consideration could be given to expanding 
their sub regional roles.  While the major accounting firms have made a significant contribution 
there could also possibly be a center of excellence established for training in accounting and 
                                                           
21 Even in a relatively advanced market like Tunisia it is estimated that no more than 25% of insurance staff are fully 
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auditing principles for the financial sector –  an existing training institute such as that established 
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Annex Table 1: Income Levels and Demographic Characteristics 
 














Algeria  4029  34.6  99  -  14.7  46.9 
Bahrain  28240  0.7  81  32  1114.8  40.1 
Egypt  2269  80.5  90  -  82.9  58.4 
Jordan  3829  6.4  92  48  156.8  34.4 
KSA  14540  25.7  100  19  67  61.6 
Kuwait  54260  0.7  85  48  12.7  54.6 
Lebanon  8157  4.1  60  -  406.1  48.4 
Libya  9714  6.5  97  -  3.6  52.4 
Morocco  2795  31.6  98  -  71.6  50.9 
Oman  21649  3.0  >90  17  9.2  52.5 
Qatar  62451  0.8  78   80  121.6  20.6 
Syria  2474  22.2  90  -  113.9  61.8 
Tunisia  3792  10.6  98  -  63.8  42.8 
UAE  58272  5.0  96  58  55  25.2 
Yemen  1118  23.5  >95  -  44.7  85.7 
MENA  18506  17.2        155.9  49.1 
GCC  39902  6.3        245.0  37.9 
Non-GCC   4242  24.4        96.5  56.5 
Oil   28403  11.3        178.0  43.2 
Non-Oil   3660  26.1        122.7  58.0 
Sources:  Axco Reports, US Census Bureau, IMF WEO, World Bank analysis 
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Annex Table 2: Relevant Policy Variables 
 







(% of GDP) 









Algeria  3.0  17  12.6  72     
Bahrain  1.6  12  75.4  0     
Egypt  7.4  30  43.6  61  Y  Y 
Jordan  3.8  14.5  88.7  0    Y 
KSA  2.0  18  41.8  22  Y   
Kuwait  3.4  17  60.1  0     
Lebanon  3.0  8.5  73.5  0    Y 
Libya  -0.4  14.25  6.1  44     
Morocco  1.9  11.89  78.4  0    Y 
Oman  2.9  13  39.4  0    Y 
Qatar  5.5  15  45.9  0     
Syria  4.8  21  15.7  47     
Tunisia  3.2  15.5  63.2  20    Y 
UAE  6.7  20  73.8  0  Y   
Yemen  10.5  19  7.2  14     
Sources:  AXCO,  
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Annex Table 3: Stylized Non Life Insurance Development Model 
 











Motor vehicle accident 
Motor vehicle credit coverage 
Construction 
Industrial 
Compulsory motor vehicle liability 
Motor vehicle loss/damage 
Construction liability (sometimes compulsory) 










Household fire, mortgage lenders risk 
Fire, loss of profits, workman‟s compensation  
Health and accident insurance, group medical 
Comprehensive motor vehicle 
Flood, earthquake  
Industrial  Tort exposure 
Households 
Consumer credit purchases 
General and professional liability  
Multi coverage householders insurance  
Consumer credit insurance, warranties 
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Annex Table 4: Compulsory Insurance Lines 





Algeria  Bahrain  Egypt  Jordan  KSA  Kuwait  Lebanon  Libya  Morocco  Oman  Qatar  Syria  Tunisia  UAE 
Expat.  Med 
Expense 
        x                  x 
Fire and 
Explosion 
x                           
Cat. cover  x                           
Property                             
Registered 
entities 
                      x  x   
Marine cargo 
imports 
              x        x  x   
Vessel and 
aircraft hull 
x                      x     
Public 
Liability 
                           
Hotels and 
restaurants 
      x                x     
Registered 
entities 
                      x     
CAR                        x     
Petrol stations                        x     
Third Party 
Liability 
                           
Motor liab.  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Public sector 
contractors 
x                           
Lifting 
devices 
x                        x   
Excursion 
/campsites 
x                      x  x   
Product f  x                           




x                           
WCA    x          x    x  x         
Light aircraft 
testing 
    x                       
Pleasure craft            x                 
Professional 
Liability 
      x                     
Construction 
professionals 
x                x           
Engineers                      x       
Blood med.  x                        x   
Property 
decenial 
x                        x   
Medical          x      x    x         
Accountants.                  x        x   
Lawyers                             
Insurance 
consultants 
x  x  x    x  x      x  x        x 
Port operators                          x   37 
 




Annex Table 5: Development Drivers of the Life Insurance Industry (Source: Feyen, Lester, and Rocha (2010) 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the volume of life insurance premiums as a fraction of GDP.  The sample consists of annual data for the period 2000-
08.  All regressions are estimated using pooled Ordinary Least Squares.  Year-fixed effects and a constant were estimated but are not reported.  LSCHOOLING, 
LLIFE_EXP, LINCOMETOP20, and LCONTRIB_RATE are sample period averages.   In all regressions, White‟s heteroskedasticity-consistent (clustered) t-
values are given in parentheses (brackets). ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
LGDPPC  1.06  0.96  0.92  0.61  0.37  0.29  0.43 
 
(16.9)***  (14.4)***  (12.8)***  (12.5)***  (9.03)***  (4.99)***  (3.63)*** 
 
[6.04]***  [5.32]***  [5.56]***  [6.52]***  [3.31]***  [2.07]**  [2.03]** 
LPOP  0.32  0.32  0.24  0.21  0.31  0.12  0.23 
 
(11.5)***  (12.6)***  (7.32)***  (6.11)***  (12.0)***  (3.30)***  (5.82)*** 
 
[4.21]***  [4.65]***  [2.94]***  [3.02]***  [4.63]***  [1.15]  [3.23]*** 
LPOP_DENSITY  0.48  0.45  0.39  0.38  0.25  0.27  0.45 
 
(10.5)***  (10.7)***  (7.48)***  (7.27)***  (6.19)***  (8.81)***  (6.05)*** 
 
[3.78]***  [3.98]***  [3.24]***  [3.94]***  [2.30]**  [3.15]***  [4.20]*** 
INFLATION  -2.90  -3.20  -6.10  -8.89  -0.79  -5.81  -8.15 
 
(-5.84)***  (-5.96)***  (-5.23)***  (-5.81)***  (-1.23)  (-3.24)***  (-5.71)*** 
 
[-3.25]***  [-3.51]***  [-5.35]***  [-4.15]***  [-0.66]  [-1.64]  [-5.00]*** 
LLIFE_EXP  -3.00  -3.71 
       
-0.14 
 
(-3.33)***  (-4.62)*** 
       
(-0.15) 
 
[-1.18]  [-1.64] 
       
[-0.11] 
LAGEDEP  0.17 













         
   
(10.4)*** 
         
   
[3.76]*** 
          LAGEDEP_YNG 
 
0.53 
         
   
(3.11)*** 
         
   
[1.20] 
          LSCHOOLING 
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Annex Table 6: Development Drivers of the Non-Life Insurance Industry (Source: Feyen, Lester, and Rocha (2010)) 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the volume of non-life insurance premiums as a fraction of GDP.  The sample consists of annual data for the period 
2000-08.    All  regressions  are  estimated  using  pooled  Ordinary  Least  Squares.    Year-fixed  effects  and  a  constant  were  estimated  but  are  not  reported.  
LSCHOOLING, LLIFE_EXP, LINCOMETOP20, and LCONTRIB_RATE are sample period averages.  In all regressions, White‟s heteroskedasticity-consistent 
(clustered) t-values are given in parentheses (brackets).  ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
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Annex Table 7: Distribution channels 
Non-life 
  Motor  Non Motor 
  Agent  Broker  Direct  Agent  Broker  Direct 
Bahrain  5  50  45  5  60  35 
Jordan  79  21  0  36  64  0 
Lebanon  30  40  30  20  60  20 
Libya  40  0  60  10  0  90 
Oman  25  30  45  5  50  45 
Qatar  5  7  88  20  10  70 
KSA  5  47  48  10  20  70 
Tunisia*  26  61  13  37  35  25 
UAE  5  50  45  20  30  50 
Source: AXCO Reports and Country Visits 
*Banks also distribute non life 
Notes:  Most personal lines distribution in Egypt has been placed through agents , and commercial and  industrial 
business have been written directly – corporate brokers were only recently authorized.  In Morocco the corporate 




  Individual Life  Group Life 
  Agent  Broker  Bank  Direct  Agent  Broker  Bank  Direct 
Kuwait  90      10  3  80    17 
Lebanon  25    50  25  20  10  10  60 
Libya  20  0    80  5      95 
Oman  70  5    25  0  80    25 
Qatar  85  5    15  20  5    75 
KSA  75  5    20  75  5    20 
Tunisia  23  10  40  27  23  26    51 
UAE  55  10    35    50    50 
Source: AXCO Reports and Country Visits 
Notes: The main distributions systems for Egypt have been agency forces and, increasingly, banks. In Morocco 
bancassurance now accounts for more than 60% of life sales, although brokers still have a role in the group life 
market. 
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Appendix: Takaful (Cooperative) Insurance 
Takaful can be considered a mutual insurance hybrid, operating in a new segment of the overall 
universe of insurance models. It has similarities to a Western business model involving a mutual 
insurance company being run by a stock insurer or management company for a fee (and possibly 
a profit or income share).  This structure is shown in the main business structures (models) in 
Takaful, namely mudharaba, wakala, and wakala with mudharaba.  Pure mutual or cooperative 
models are not common in Takaful as it does not allow profit for the operator, but would (subject 
to  investment  requirements)  accord  with  Islamic  concepts  or  for  a  government  interested  in 
helping segments of the population to deal with risk in an Islamic manner.   
The hybrid consists of a shareholders‟ (Takaful Operator‟s or TOs) fund, a contributors mutual 
risk assumption fund (called the Participants‟ Takaful Fund or PTF) and, for products with a 
savings component a contributors‟ investment fund (called the Participants‟ Investment Fund or 
PIF). The TO provides management services and capital support to the participants‟ fund(s). 
Strictly speaking, the TO may not donate to the PTF and any funds injected to support the policy 
liabilities are a loan (Quard Hassan) under Shariah law. Conceptually this should be repaid 
without any returns from future surpluses arising in the PTF. 
The acceptability of the PTF involves an interpretation of the Shariah Law (interpretations of the 
Q‟uran and sunnah
23) under which the concept of a gratuitous gift can be made contingent on 
reciprocity (hibah mashrutah bi‟iwad) and to apply on a group basis. It is believed by some 
authorities that this overcomes the issues of uncertainty inherent in risk transfer for a price (Al-
Gharar) and the related issue of gambling (Al-Maysir) which are forbidden elements of 
transactions under Shariah Law. The third forbidden element is the investment of funds in 
instruments generating returns not related to the performance of the underlying assets (Riba). 
The various structures are driven by the relationship between the TO and the funds generated by 
participant donations (Tabarru), and in particular the method of remuneration of the TO. This can 
involve a straight management fee (Wakalah) and/ or a participation in any underwriting surplus 
or investment return generated in the policyholder funds (Mudharabah). Most Takaful systems in 
the Middle East follow a combined model. TO participation rights in any underwriting surplus 
are the most controversial and under a strict interpretation would appear to be illegal. However 
this has been allowed in some cases as it aligns the interests of the TO and the participants. 
Corporate governance issues in Takaful arise from the use of qard hasan, or interest free loans. 
Such loans are used when there is a deficit in the risk fund.  The structure normally used is for 
the qard to be considered an injection from the point of view of the risk fund but a loan from the 
operators fund point of view. This discrepancy potentially allows operators to show impressive 
results  whilst  selling unprofitable business.   This  also  extends into such things  as  obtaining 
significant retakaful but with the retakaful commissions not being sufficient to cover the wakala 
fees of the policy being retakaful. The result is deficits for the retakaful business that would 
likely be made up by other profitable plans.  
The significant diversity in Takaful models has also led to difficulties in regulating Takaful. 
Takaful  is  sometimes  grouped  together  with  conventional  insurance  for  the  purposes  of 
regulations, which ignore fundamental differences. Even when Takaful is regulated separately 
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there are issues of implied benefits and guarantees even where none formally exist. This seems to 
be an issue for mutual insurers as well, with mutual insurance tending to be an afterthought in 
regulations, as well as an issue with some other faith based organizations offering discretionary 
benefit or voluntary sharing in medical expenses which are not effectively regulated.  
Risk based capital requirements for Takaful insurers are likely to be higher than for conventional 
insurers as the investment requirements of Takaful insurers push them towards equities, property 
and property based securities and funds (Tolefat). Ideally an active Sukuk market that provides 
some greater degree of security will develop however recent setbacks appear to be holding back 
the rate of issuance. 
Reinsurance is another key emerging issue for Takaful, particularly for those that wish to 
compete in commercial and industrial and liability markets. Strictly speaking any reinsurer used 
by a Takaful insurer should also satisfy Shariah requirements (Re-takaful) as should any 
retrocessionaires. Taking this chain to its ultimate reaches creates an almost impossible 
requirement, and some Takaful insurers have opted for co-insurance, raising the scope for 
unmeasured accumulations within individual jurisdictions. As at the date of writing there were 8 
fully established Re-takaful operators in the Middle East and a number of the major European 
reinsurers had opened Takaful windows so direct reinsurance capacity is not likely to be an issue. 
The remaining major issue in the development of the Takaful sector is the relative powerlessness 
of the policyholders relative to the TO under all current hybrid structures. This has been 
considered by an IFSB/ IAIS joint working group, which has pointed to the need for absolute 
transparency as to the contractual terms and the possible need for enhanced explanation at the 
time of sale to achieve this. Another recommendation being considered is that a separate board 
be established consisting of independent directors and a representative of the Shariah Council to 
oversight consumers‟ interests. 
The most recent survey of Takaful insurers carried out by the Middle East Insurance Review 
show that Malaysia and the GCC region continue to be the main areas of activity. Summary 
MENA data is shown in Appendix Table 1. 
Appendix Table 1 
 
Country  No. Takaful Insurers 
Algeria  1 
Bahrain  9 
Egypt  6 
KSA  26 
Kuwait  13 
Jordan  3 
Lebanon  1 
Oman  1 
Qatar  6 
Syria  2 
Tunisia  2 
Yemen  2 
Source:  Middle East Insurance Review 